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pgmorbac/docs/DOCUMENTATION.md
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# pg_morbac Documentation
Complete technical documentation for the Multi-OrBAC PostgreSQL extension.
## Table of Contents
- [Architecture](#architecture)
- [Schema Reference](#schema-reference)
- [Core Concepts](#core-concepts)
- [Advanced Features](#advanced-features)
- [API Reference](#api-reference)
- [Integration Guides](#integration-guides)
- [Performance](#performance)
- [Security Model](#security-model)
## Architecture
### Design Principles
pg_morbac is built on these principles:
1. **Pure PostgreSQL**: No external dependencies (except pgcrypto)
2. **Schema Isolation**: All objects in `morbac` schema
3. **Default Deny**: No permission = access denied
4. **Prohibition Precedence**: Prohibitions checked first, always override permissions
5. **Organization-Centric**: All policies scoped to organizations
6. **Multi-Tenant Native**: Users and resources can span organizations
### Authorization Flow
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A[Authorization Request] --> B[Get Comprehensive Roles]
B --> C[Direct Assignments]
B --> D[Delegations]
B --> E[Derived Roles]
B --> F[Role Hierarchy]
C --> G[Filter Negative Assignments]
D --> G
E --> G
F --> G
G --> H{Check Prohibitions}
H -->|Found| I[DENY]
H -->|Not Found| J{Check Permissions}
J -->|Found| K[ALLOW]
J -->|Not Found| L[DENY - Default]
```
### Performance Optimizations
**Prohibition-first checking:** Prohibitions are checked before permissions for early exit on denial.
**Indexed foreign keys:** All foreign key relationships have indexes for fast joins.
**Composite indexes:** Optimized indexes for common query patterns (org_id, role_id, activity, view).
**STABLE functions:** RLS functions are marked STABLE for transaction-level caching.
**Recursive CTEs:** Efficient hierarchy traversal using PostgreSQL's recursive common table expressions.
## Schema Reference
### Entity Relationship Diagram
```mermaid
erDiagram
orgs ||--o{ orgs : "parent_id"
orgs ||--o{ roles : "has"
orgs ||--o{ user_roles : "contains"
orgs ||--o{ rules : "defines"
roles ||--o{ user_roles : "assigned_to"
roles ||--o{ role_hierarchy : "senior"
roles ||--o{ role_hierarchy : "junior"
roles ||--o{ rules : "applies_to"
activities ||--o{ rules : "action"
activities ||--o{ activity_hierarchy : "parent"
activities ||--o{ activity_hierarchy : "child"
views ||--o{ rules : "target"
views ||--o{ view_hierarchy : "parent"
views ||--o{ view_hierarchy : "child"
contexts ||--o{ rules : "condition"
roles ||--o{ delegations : "delegated"
roles ||--o{ negative_role_assignments : "prohibited"
roles ||--o{ sod_conflicts : "conflicts_with"
roles ||--o{ derived_roles : "computed"
```
### Core Tables
**morbac.orgs**: Organizations with hierarchy support (`parent_id` self-reference). Unique name required. Supports metadata as JSONB.
**morbac.roles**: Roles scoped to organizations. Unique `(org_id, name)` constraint ensures role names are unique within each org.
**morbac.role_hierarchy**: Role inheritance via `(senior_role_id, junior_role_id)`. Senior roles inherit all junior permissions. Supports transitive closure.
**morbac.user_roles**: Direct user-to-role assignments. Primary key on `(user_id, role_id, org_id)`. Note: `user_id` is external (application manages users).
**morbac.activities**: Abstract actions (global scope). Text primary key. Examples: `read`, `write`, `delete`, `approve`.
**morbac.activity_hierarchy**: Activity inheritance via `(parent_activity, child_activity)`. Permission to parent grants child activities.
**morbac.views**: Abstract object categories (global scope). Text primary key. Examples: `documents`, `reports`, `financial_data`.
**morbac.view_hierarchy**: View inheritance via `(parent_view, child_view)`. Access to parent grants child views.
**morbac.contexts**: Contextual conditions as callable predicates. Column `evaluator` (REGPROC) references a function returning BOOLEAN (preferably STABLE). Built-in context `always` returns true.
**morbac.rules**: Core policy rules linking org, role, activity, view, context, and modality. Indexed on `(org_id, role_id, activity, view, modality)` for fast lookups.
**morbac.policy**: Policy DSL using names instead of UUIDs. Insert here, then call `compile_policy()` to generate rules.
### Advanced Feature Tables
**morbac.delegations**
Temporal role delegation with time bounds.
**Key columns:**
- `delegator_user_id`: User granting the role
- `delegate_user_id`: User receiving the role
- `role_id`, `org_id`: Role being delegated
- `valid_from`, `valid_until`: Time window (NULL = indefinite)
**Behavior:** Automatically included in `get_comprehensive_roles()` when active.
**morbac.negative_role_assignments**
Explicit role prohibitions with highest precedence.
**Key columns:**
- `user_id`, `role_id`, `org_id`: Assignment to prohibit
- `reason`: Explanation for prohibition
**Behavior:** Overrides direct assignments, delegations, and derived roles.
**morbac.sod_conflicts**
Separation of Duty constraints enforce mutually exclusive roles.
**Key columns:**
- `role1_id`, `role2_id`: Conflicting role pair
- `org_id`: Organization scope
- `description`: Explanation of conflict
**Behavior:** Prevents users from holding both roles simultaneously. Validated via `check_sod_violation()` before role assignment.
**morbac.role_cardinality**
Constrains the number of users per role.
**Key columns:**
- `role_id`, `org_id`: Role to constrain
- `min_users`: Minimum required users (default 0)
- `max_users`: Maximum allowed users (NULL = unlimited)
**Behavior:** Validated via `check_cardinality_violation()` before role assignment.
**morbac.derived_roles**
Dynamically computed roles via custom functions.
**Key columns:**
- `role_id`, `org_id`: Role to compute
- `evaluator`: Function returning `TABLE(user_id UUID, org_id UUID)`
- `description`: Explanation of computation logic
**Behavior:** Function is called at runtime to determine role membership. Included in `get_comprehensive_roles()`.
**morbac.cross_org_rules**
Inter-organizational access policies.
**Key columns:**
- `source_org_id`: Organization where role is held
- `target_org_id`: Organization where access is granted
- `role_id`, `activity`, `view`: Policy specification
- `modality`: Permission or prohibition
**Behavior:** Allows roles in source organization to access resources in target organization.
**morbac.admin_rules**
Administration meta-policies for delegated management.
**Key columns:**
- `org_id`, `role_id`: Role receiving admin capabilities
- `can_manage_policies`: Can create/modify policies
- `can_manage_roles`: Can create/modify roles
- `can_manage_users`: Can assign/revoke user roles
**Behavior:** Enables organization-scoped administrators without database superuser privileges.
## Core Concepts
### Deontic Modalities
Multi-OrBAC implements four modalities:
1. **Permission**: Allows action (if no prohibition)
2. **Prohibition**: Denies action (always wins)
3. **Obligation**: Must be done (informational only)
4. **Recommendation**: Should be done (informational only)
Only permissions and prohibitions affect `is_allowed()` decisions.
### Context Evaluation
Contexts are boolean predicates that determine if a rule applies:
```sql
-- Context function signature
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION morbac.my_context()
RETURNS BOOLEAN
LANGUAGE plpgsql
STABLE -- Important for RLS performance
AS $$
BEGIN
RETURN <condition>;
END;
$$;
-- Register context
INSERT INTO morbac.contexts (name, evaluator) VALUES
('my_context', 'morbac.my_context'::regproc);
```
Context functions should:
- Use STABLE (not VOLATILE) for RLS compatibility
- Keep logic simple and fast
- Avoid external dependencies
- Consider caching if computation is expensive
### Policy DSL
Simplified policy declaration:
```sql
-- Insert policies using names
INSERT INTO morbac.policy (org_name, role_name, activity, view, modality) VALUES
('Acme Corp', 'manager', 'approve', 'requests', 'permission');
-- Compile (idempotent)
SELECT * FROM morbac.compile_policy();
```
Compiler behavior:
- Creates missing activities/views
- Resolves names to UUIDs
- Creates entries in `morbac.rules`
- Reports errors for missing orgs/roles/contexts
- Safe to run multiple times
## Advanced Features
### Hierarchies
Organizations, roles, activities, and views all support hierarchical relationships with transitive closure.
```sql
-- Organization hierarchy (via parent_id)
INSERT INTO morbac.orgs (name, parent_id) VALUES ('EMEA', parent_org_id);
SELECT * FROM morbac.get_org_ancestors(org_id);
SELECT * FROM morbac.get_org_descendants(org_id);
-- Role hierarchy (senior inherits from junior)
INSERT INTO morbac.role_hierarchy (senior_role_id, junior_role_id)
VALUES (manager_role_id, employee_role_id);
SELECT * FROM morbac.get_inherited_roles(role_id);
-- Activity hierarchy (parent includes children)
INSERT INTO morbac.activity_hierarchy (parent_activity, child_activity)
VALUES ('write', 'create'), ('write', 'update');
SELECT * FROM morbac.get_effective_activities('write');
-- View hierarchy (parent includes children)
INSERT INTO morbac.view_hierarchy (parent_view, child_view)
VALUES ('documents', 'invoices'), ('documents', 'contracts');
SELECT * FROM morbac.get_effective_views('documents');
```
Example hierarchy diagram:
```mermaid
graph TD
A[Director] -->|inherits from| B[Manager]
B -->|inherits from| C[Employee]
A -.->|transitive| C
```
### Delegation
Temporary role delegation with time bounds:
```sql
INSERT INTO morbac.delegations (
delegator_user_id, delegate_user_id, role_id, org_id,
valid_from, valid_until
) VALUES (
alice_uuid, bob_uuid, approver_role_id, org_id,
NOW(), NOW() + INTERVAL '7 days'
);
```
Automatically included in `get_comprehensive_roles()` when active. Set `valid_until` to NULL for indefinite delegation.
### Negative Role Assignments
Explicit prohibitions with highest precedence:
```sql
INSERT INTO morbac.negative_role_assignments (user_id, role_id, org_id, reason)
VALUES (user_uuid, admin_role_id, org_id, 'Security audit requirement');
```
### Separation of Duty
Prevents users from holding conflicting roles that could enable fraud or abuse.
**Example: Financial Controls**
In an accounting system, the same person should not both create and approve invoices:
```sql
-- Create roles
INSERT INTO morbac.roles (org_id, name) VALUES
(org_id, 'invoice_creator'),
(org_id, 'invoice_approver');
-- Define conflict
INSERT INTO morbac.sod_conflicts (role1_id, role2_id, org_id, description)
VALUES (creator_role_id, approver_role_id, org_id, 'Financial controls: prevent self-approval');
-- Check before assignment
SELECT morbac.check_sod_violation(alice_uuid, org_id);
-- Returns: empty array if valid, or ['invoice_creator', 'invoice_approver'] if conflict exists
```
If Alice already has the `invoice_creator` role, attempting to assign `invoice_approver` will violate the constraint.
### Cardinality Constraints
Enforce minimum and maximum users per role:
```sql
-- Require 1-3 administrators
INSERT INTO morbac.role_cardinality (role_id, org_id, min_users, max_users)
VALUES (admin_role_id, org_id, 1, 3);
-- Validate before assignment
SELECT morbac.check_cardinality_violation(admin_role_id, org_id);
-- Returns: error message if constraint violated, NULL if valid
```
Dynamically computed roles via custom functions:
```sql
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION morbac.eval_project_leads()
RETURNS TABLE(user_id UUID, org_id UUID)
LANGUAGE sql STABLE AS $$
SELECT user_id, org_id FROM app.projects WHERE lead_user_id IS NOT NULL;
$$;
INSERT INTO morbac.derived_roles (role_id, org_id, evaluator)
VALUES (project_lead_role_id, org_id, 'morbac.eval_project_leads'::regproc);
```
### Cross-Organizational Rules
Inter-organizational access policies:
```sql
INSERT INTO morbac.cross_org_rules (
source_org_id, target_org_id, role_id, activity, view, modality
) VALUES (
global_org_id, subsidiary_org_id, auditor_role_id,
'read', 'financial_reports', 'permission'
);
```
### Administration Rules
Meta-policies for policy management:
```sql
INSERT INTO morbac.admin_rules (org_id, role_id, can_manage_policies)
VALUES (org_id, sec_admin_role_id, true);
SELECT morbac.is_admin_allowed(user_uuid, org_id, 'manage_policies');
```
### Temporal Constraints
Rules and cross-organizational rules support optional temporal validity periods. Rules are only active within their specified time window.
**Adding temporal constraints to rules:**
```sql
-- Rule active only in 2024
INSERT INTO morbac.rules (org_id, role_id, activity, view, context_id, modality, valid_from, valid_until)
VALUES (org_id, contractor_role_id, 'read', 'projects', ctx_id, 'permission',
'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00', '2024-12-31 23:59:59+00');
-- Rule active starting from a specific date (no end date)
INSERT INTO morbac.rules (org_id, role_id, activity, view, context_id, modality, valid_from)
VALUES (org_id, employee_role_id, 'read', 'handbook', ctx_id, 'permission',
'2024-06-01 00:00:00+00');
-- Rule expires at a specific date
INSERT INTO morbac.rules (org_id, role_id, activity, view, context_id, modality, valid_until)
VALUES (org_id, temp_role_id, 'write', 'reports', ctx_id, 'permission',
'2024-12-31 23:59:59+00');
```
**Temporal constraints on cross-org rules:**
```sql
INSERT INTO morbac.cross_org_rules (
source_org_id, target_org_id, role_id, activity, view, modality,
valid_from, valid_until
) VALUES (
parent_org_id, subsidiary_org_id, auditor_role_id,
'read', 'financial_data', 'permission',
'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00', '2024-03-31 23:59:59+00'
);
```
**Checking rule validity manually:**
```sql
SELECT morbac.is_rule_valid(valid_from, valid_until);
-- Returns: TRUE if current time is within bounds (or no constraints set)
-- FALSE if outside validity period
```
**Behavior:**
- Both `valid_from` and `valid_until` are optional (can be NULL)
- If both are NULL, rule is always active
- If only `valid_from` is set, rule is active from that time onwards
- If only `valid_until` is set, rule is active until that time
- If both are set, rule is active only during that window
- `is_allowed()` automatically checks temporal validity for all rules
- Expired rules are effectively inactive but remain in database for audit purposes
### Audit Logging
Comprehensive audit trail for security-critical operations. The audit system tracks all INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE operations on specified tables.
**Audit log table structure:**
```sql
morbac.audit_log (
id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
timestamp TIMESTAMPTZ, -- When change occurred
user_id UUID, -- User making change (if applicable)
org_id UUID, -- Organization context
table_name TEXT, -- Table being modified
operation TEXT, -- INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE
record_id UUID, -- ID of affected record
old_data JSONB, -- Record state before change (UPDATE/DELETE)
new_data JSONB, -- Record state after change (INSERT/UPDATE)
changed_fields TEXT[], -- List of modified columns (UPDATE)
session_user TEXT, -- PostgreSQL session user
client_addr INET, -- Client IP address
application_name TEXT, -- Application name from connection
metadata JSONB -- Additional custom metadata
)
```
**Enabling audit logging:**
```sql
-- Enable auditing on user_roles table
SELECT morbac.enable_audit('user_roles');
-- Enable auditing on multiple tables
SELECT morbac.enable_audit('rules');
SELECT morbac.enable_audit('delegations');
SELECT morbac.enable_audit('admin_rules');
```
**Disabling audit logging:**
```sql
SELECT morbac.disable_audit('user_roles');
```
**Querying audit log:**
```sql
-- Recent changes to user_roles
SELECT
timestamp,
operation,
session_user,
old_data->>'role_id' AS old_role,
new_data->>'role_id' AS new_role
FROM morbac.audit_log
WHERE table_name = 'user_roles'
ORDER BY timestamp DESC
LIMIT 20;
-- All changes by specific user
SELECT * FROM morbac.audit_log
WHERE user_id = '123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000'
ORDER BY timestamp DESC;
-- Changes to specific record
SELECT * FROM morbac.audit_log
WHERE table_name = 'rules' AND record_id = rule_uuid
ORDER BY timestamp;
-- Detect field-level changes
SELECT
timestamp,
record_id,
changed_fields,
old_data,
new_data
FROM morbac.audit_log
WHERE table_name = 'rules'
AND operation = 'UPDATE'
AND 'modality' = ANY(changed_fields);
```
**Best practices:**
- Enable auditing on security-critical tables: `user_roles`, `rules`, `delegations`, `admin_rules`, `sod_conflicts`
- Create indexes on frequently queried columns: `CREATE INDEX ON morbac.audit_log(table_name, timestamp DESC)`
- Implement retention policies to archive old audit logs
- Use JSONB operators to query `old_data` and `new_data` efficiently
- Consider partitioning `audit_log` by timestamp for large installations
## API Reference
### Authorization Functions
**`is_allowed(user_id, org_id, activity, view)`**: Main authorization decision. Returns BOOLEAN. Checks prohibitions first, then permissions, defaults to deny.
```sql
SELECT morbac.is_allowed(user_uuid, org_uuid, 'read', 'documents');
```
**`get_comprehensive_roles(user_id, org_id)`**: Returns all roles for user (direct, delegated, derived, hierarchy, minus negative assignments).
**`get_effective_roles(user_id, org_id)`**: Alias for `get_comprehensive_roles()`.
### Hierarchy Functions
**`get_org_ancestors(org_id)`**: Returns all parent organizations with depth.
**`get_org_descendants(org_id)`**: Returns all child organizations with depth.
**`get_inherited_roles(role_id)`**: Returns all junior roles (transitive).
**`get_effective_activities(activity)`**: Returns activity plus all child activities.
**`get_effective_views(view)`**: Returns view plus all child views.
### Validation Functions
**`check_sod_violation(user_id, org_id)`**: Returns empty array if valid, or array of conflicting role name pairs if violations exist.
**`check_cardinality_violation(role_id, org_id)`**: Returns error message if constraint violated, NULL if valid.
### Administration Functions
**`is_admin_allowed(user_id, org_id, capability)`**: Check administrative permissions. Capabilities: `manage_policies`, `manage_roles`, `manage_users`.
**`eval_derived_role(user_id, org_id, derived_role_id)`**: Evaluate if user has derived role.
### Context Functions
**`eval_context(context_id)`**: Evaluate a context predicate.
### Policy DSL Functions
**`compile_policy()`**: Compile policy DSL into rules. Returns TABLE with success status and messages. Idempotent.
### RLS Helper Functions
**`current_user_id()`**: Get user ID from `request.header.x-user-id` (PostgREST) or `current_setting('morbac.user_id')`.
**`current_org_id()`**: Get org ID from `request.header.x-org-id` (PostgREST) or `current_setting('morbac.org_id')`.
**`rls_check(activity, view)`**: Authorization check for RLS policies using current user/org context.
```sql
CREATE POLICY my_policy ON app.table
FOR SELECT USING (morbac.rls_check('read', 'documents'));
```
### Informational Functions
**`pending_obligations(user_id, org_id)`**: Returns obligations for user (informational only).
**`pending_recommendations(user_id, org_id)`**: Returns recommendations for user (informational only).
**`user_has_role(user_id, org_id, role_name)`**: Check if user has specific role by name.
```sql
morbac.user_has_role(
p_user_id UUID,
p_org_id UUID,
p_role_name TEXT
) RETURNS BOOLEAN
```
## Integration Guides
### PostgREST Integration
Configure PostgREST to pass user/org context via headers:
```nginx
# Nginx config
proxy_set_header X-User-Id $user_id;
proxy_set_header X-Org-Id $org_id;
```
Enable RLS and grant permissions:
```sql
ALTER TABLE app.documents ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA morbac TO postgrest_role;
GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA morbac TO postgrest_role;
GRANT EXECUTE ON ALL FUNCTIONS IN SCHEMA morbac TO postgrest_role;
```
Create RLS policies:
```sql
CREATE POLICY document_read ON app.documents
FOR SELECT
USING (morbac.rls_check('read', 'documents'));
CREATE POLICY document_write ON app.documents
FOR INSERT
WITH CHECK (morbac.rls_check('write', 'documents'));
```
Alternative method using session variables:
```sql
SET morbac.user_id = '123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000';
SET morbac.org_id = '987fcdeb-51a2-43d7-9c6e-5a8b7c9d0e1f';
```
### Application Integration
Python example:
```python
import psycopg2
conn = psycopg2.connect("dbname=mydb")
cursor = conn.cursor()
cursor.execute("SET morbac.user_id = %s", [user_id])
cursor.execute("SET morbac.org_id = %s", [org_id])
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM app.documents") # RLS enforced
```
Node.js example:
```javascript
const client = await pool.connect();
await client.query('SET morbac.user_id = $1', [userId]);
await client.query('SET morbac.org_id = $1', [orgId]);
const res = await client.query('SELECT * FROM app.documents');
```
### Multi-Organization Resources
Resources can belong to multiple organizations using a junction table:
```sql
-- Application defines document-org relationships
-- morbac.rls_check() enforces access rules
CREATE POLICY doc_access ON app.documents FOR SELECT USING (
EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM app.document_orgs
WHERE document_id = app.documents.id
AND org_id = morbac.current_org_id()
)
AND morbac.rls_check('read', 'documents')
);
```
## Performance
### Optimization Strategies
Prohibition-first checking provides early exit on denial for both security and performance.
For large hierarchies, use materialized views:
```sql
CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW morbac.mv_role_closure AS
SELECT senior_role_id, junior_role_id FROM ...;
CREATE INDEX ON morbac.mv_role_closure(senior_role_id);
REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW morbac.mv_role_closure;
```
Context optimization:
- Use STABLE functions (not VOLATILE) for RLS caching
- Avoid expensive computations or external calls
- Keep context logic simple
All foreign keys are indexed. Critical composite indexes exist on `(user_id, org_id)` and `(org_id, role_id, activity, view, modality)`.
### Benchmarking
Example query performance (1M rules, 10K users, 100 orgs):
```sql
-- Simple authorization check
EXPLAIN ANALYZE
SELECT morbac.is_allowed(user_id, org_id, 'read', 'documents');
-- Typical: 5-15ms
-- With hierarchies (3 levels)
EXPLAIN ANALYZE
SELECT morbac.is_allowed(user_id, org_id, 'read', 'documents');
-- Typical: 10-30ms
-- RLS query (1M rows)
EXPLAIN ANALYZE
SELECT * FROM app.documents WHERE morbac.rls_check('read', 'documents');
-- Depends on selectivity, uses indexes
```
## Security Model
### Threat Model
Protected against:
- Unauthorized access (default deny)
- Privilege escalation (prohibition precedence)
- SQL injection (parameterized queries)
- Org boundary violations (explicit cross-org rules)
Not protected against:
- Malicious context functions (trusted code)
- Database user privilege escalation (PostgreSQL security model)
- Time-of-check/time-of-use races (transaction-based consistency only)
### Security Best Practices
**Context Function Security**
```sql
-- BAD: Leaks information
CREATE FUNCTION morbac.bad_context()
RETURNS BOOLEAN VOLATILE AS $$
SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM sensitive_table);
$$;
-- GOOD: Self-contained, stable
CREATE FUNCTION morbac.good_context()
RETURNS BOOLEAN STABLE AS $$
SELECT EXTRACT(HOUR FROM CURRENT_TIME) BETWEEN 9 AND 17;
$$;
```
**User ID Validation**
```sql
-- Validate user exists before authorization
SELECT morbac.is_allowed(
user_id, -- Must be from authenticated session
org_id,
activity,
view
);
```
**Org Context Validation**
```sql
-- Verify user belongs to org
SELECT EXISTS(
SELECT 1 FROM morbac.user_roles
WHERE user_id = ? AND org_id = ?
);
```
### Comparison: Multi-OrBAC vs Traditional RBAC
| Aspect | Traditional RBAC | Multi-OrBAC (pg_morbac) |
|--------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| **Multi-tenancy** | Single tenant or complex workarounds | Native multi-organization |
| **Prohibition** | No standard support | First-class, always wins |
| **Context** | Static permissions | Dynamic, condition-based |
| **Hierarchy** | Basic (roles only) | Full (orgs, roles, activities, views) |
| **Delegation** | Manual implementation | Native temporal delegation |
| **SoD** | Application logic | Database-enforced constraints |
| **Cross-tenant** | Not supported | Native cross-org rules |
| **Audit** | Application layer | Meta-policies (admin rules) |
---
## Additional Resources
- [Multi-OrBAC Research Paper](https://webhost.laas.fr/TSF/deswarte/Publications/06427.pdf)
- [test_morbac.sql](test_morbac.sql): Comprehensive examples
- [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md): Version history
- [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md): Contribution guidelines
- [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md): Security policy